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The hierarchical organisation of biological entities has important nomenclatural implications. Because of the
independence of reproductive events across different organisational levels, species are not (necessarily) clades of
organisms, and organisms are not (necessarily) clades of cells: a surviving ancestral species is a paraphyletic assemblage
of organisms, and a parental multicellular organism is a paraphyletic group of cells. Thus, clades of species might not
be clades of organisms, and clades of organisms might not be clades of cells. Phylogenetic deﬁnitions of clade names
must employ speciﬁers (analogous to ‘type taxa’) appropriate to the relevant hierarchical level: for a clade of individual
organisms, the speciﬁers should be organisms, and for a clade of species, the types should be species. If speciﬁers of the
wrong organisational level are used, the entities deﬁned can be highly problematic. At least in sexually-reproducing
taxa, deﬁnitions of higher taxa cannot circumvent the species problem by simply referring to specimens instead of
species.
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The important debate comparing the incumbent rank-
based taxonomic codes with more explicitly phyloge-
netic approaches, such as ‘‘Phylogenetic Nomenclature’’
implemented in the PhyloCode (Cantino and de Queiroz
2004), has raised important issues over the way clades
are named. The PhyloCode uses ‘‘speciﬁers’’ when
attaching names to clades; these speciﬁers can be either
taxa or traits. However, taxon speciﬁers are most
commonly employed, and the following discussion will
deal only with this sort of speciﬁer. The speciﬁers mark
the boundaries of the named clade: thus, speciﬁerse front matter
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Unlike traditional types, however, there can be more
than one speciﬁer in the phylogenetic deﬁnition of a
taxon name, and some of these speciﬁers can be outside
the named clade (e.g. in a deﬁnition such as ‘the most
inclusive clade including A but not B’). The PhyloCode
currently allows either individual organisms or species
to be used as speciﬁers. For instance, in the node-based
deﬁnition ‘‘the clade stemming from the most recent
common ancestor of A and B’’ (op. cit., p. 23), taxa
A and B can be either organisms or species. Here, we
emphasise that, because of the independence of repro-
ductive events across hierarchical levels, clades of species
will not necessarily be clades of organisms, which in turn
will not necessarily be clades of cells. Hence, phyloge-
netic deﬁnitions of clades must employ speciﬁers
appropriate to the relevant hierarchical level: for a clade
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 1. Phylogenetic relationships between three asexual
metazoans (A–C), each denoted by a square box, with
relationships between organisms (tokogenetic relationships)
shown as thick lines. Cells are shown as small circles, and cell
lineages by thin lines. Open circles represent somatic cells,
closed circles germ cells. A simpliﬁed phylogeny showing only
relationships between organisms is given at bottom right.
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isms, and for a clade of species, the speciﬁers should be
species. This observation should be relevant, not just to
the commonly-used deﬁnitions employed in the Phylo-
Code, but to all attempts to deﬁne entities in terms of
phylogenetic relationships: if speciﬁers (or ‘types’) of the
wrong organisational level are used, the entities deﬁned
will be highly problematic. It also means that, at least in
sexually reproducing taxa, deﬁnitions of higher taxa
(clades) cannot circumvent the problem of deﬁning
species simply by referring to specimens instead of
species.
Hierarchical systems consist of a series of composi-
tional levels, that is, ‘‘divisions of stuffy organised by
part–whole relations, in which wholes at one level
function as parts at the next (and at all higher) levels’’
(Wimsatt 1994, p. 222; see also Grene 1969; Mayr 1982;
Salthe 1985; Skinner 2004). ‘Wholes’ at each level are
widely recognised as individuals in the philosophical
sense (e.g. Ghiselin 1997). A number of hierarchies have
been recognised in biological systems (e.g. somatic
hierarchy; ecological hierarchy; reviewed by Salthe
1985). Of concern here is the genealogical hierarchy of
genes, cells, organisms, demes, and species. As Vrba and
Eldredge (1984; see also Eldredge and Salthe 1984;
Salthe 1985) have discussed, entities at different levels in
this hierarchy can participate in analogous processes,
such as reproduction. However, at different hierarchical
levels, the processes by which the entities reproduce will
differ qualitatively (e.g. cells reproduce by mitosis,
multicellular organisms reproduce by parthenogenesis
or sexual reproduction, species reproduce by cladogen-
esis). Moreover, a reproductive event at a speciﬁed level
(e.g. organismal birth) can cut across relationships at a
lower level (e.g. cell lineages), leaving an ancestral entity
which is a paraphyletic assemblage of lower-level entities
(e.g. the ancestral organism is a paraphyletic group of
cells). As a consequence, the monophyletic groups
generated by processes at different hierarchical levels
(cell clades, organismal clades, species clades) will often
be incongruent. There are numerous well-supported
examples of species which consist of paraphyletic groups
of organisms (see Funk and Omland 2003); similarly, all
ancestral multicellular organisms are paraphyletic
groups of cells.
Lide´n (1990) noted that even if monophyly is a
universal concept for tree-like systems, in each parti-
cular case it is meaningful only in relation to entities at a
speciﬁed hierarchical level. A statement of monophyly is
a hypothesis of common ancestry in the context of
phylogenetic relationships between certain types of
entities, and thus implicates a particular process by
which those entities can give rise to other entities
(e.g. Scott-Ram 1991). For instance, the statement that a
group of bdelloid rotifers (asexual organisms) is mono-
phyletic implies that they are descended from a singleorganism-level ancestor; the relevant relationships in
this context are those that exist between organisms,
generated in this case by parthenogenesis (Fig. 1).
Similarly, the notion that a group of somatic cells
(within a rotifer) is monophyletic means they are
descended from a single ancestral cell; the relevant
relationships in this context are those that exist between
cells, generated by cell division.
Most people would accept that the ancestral rotifer
(C) in Fig. 1 is a valid entity. However, consider the
argument that ancestral rotifer C is paraphyletic and
thus should not be recognised because, if we consider
relationships at the cellular level, some of its cells (its
germ cells) are more closely related to cells of the two
descendant rotifers than to other cells in rotifer C. This
argument is unfounded, because the concept of mono-
phyly should only be applied at one hierarchical level at
a time.
If we are applying the concept of monophyly to
organisms, it would designate a group of organisms
descended from a single ancestral organism, and the only
phylogenetic relationships relevant in this regard are
those of organisms. The basic entities in the phylogeny
are individuated on the properties relevant to the
organisational level of the organism (e.g. boundaries
marked by skin), and individual boundaries and
relationships at other levels (e.g. between cells) are
irrelevant. If our goal is to discover historical relation-
ships among asexual metazoans, any consideration of
cells is irrelevant, as cellular division is an entirely
different process to parthenogenesis and does not
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servation that the cells in an organism will constitute a
non-monophyletic assemblage (of cells) is irrelevant in
constructing a system based on the relationships of
organisms.
Moving down from the organism level, monophyly as
applied to cells would designate a group of cells
descended from a single ancestral cell, and the only
phylogeny relevant to this matter is a phylogeny of cells.
The basic entities in the phylogeny are individuated on
properties relevant to the organisational level of the cell
(e.g. boundaries marked by the cell membrane);
boundaries between entities at other levels (e.g. between
organisms) are irrelevant. If our concern is the historical
relationships of cells, any consideration of organisms is
extraneous, since tokogenesis (organismal reproduction)
is a process that can proceed independently of cell
division and does not produce monophyletic groups of
cells. Similarly, moving above the organism level, if we
are applying the concept of monophyly to lineages of
sexually reproducing organisms ( ¼ ‘‘species’’ sensu de
Queiroz 1998), it would designate a group of species
descended from a single ancestral species, and the only
phylogeny relevant to this matter is a phylogeny of
species. The basic entities in the phylogeny are
individuated on the properties relevant to the organisa-
tional level of the species (e.g. boundaries marked by
reproductive isolation), and boundaries at other levels
(e.g. between cells or organisms) are irrelevant. Again, if
our goal is to discover historical relationships among
species, consideration of organismal genealogies is
irrelevant, as organismal reproduction is an entirely
different process to speciation and does not produce
monophyletic groups of species. Accordingly, that the
organisms or demes composing a species may constitute
a non-monophyletic assemblage is irrelevant in con-
structing a system of relationships based on relation-
ships between species-level entities (see Frost and Kluge
1994; Skinner 2004). Thus, because of the disconnect
between reproductive processes at different hierarchical
levels, monophyly at different hierarchical levels will not
coincide: a clade of species-level entities will not
necessarily be a clade of organisms, and a clade of
organisms will not necessarily be a clade of cells.
The PhyloCode is designed to name clades, deﬁned as
‘‘an ancestor (organism, population, or species) and all
of its descendants’’ (Cantino and de Queiroz 2004,
p. 45). This implies correctly that clades can be
recognised and named at different hierarchical levels,
based on ancestral-descendant (i.e. reproductive) rela-
tionships between different-level entities (e.g. organisms,
species). In asexual taxa that reproduce primarily by
binary ﬁssion, the entities that form clades ( ¼ clonal
lineages) are individual organisms. Accordingly, it is
appropriate that the entities used when deﬁning such
clades (speciﬁers) are individual organisms: the deﬁni-tion ‘the clade stemming from the most recent common
ancestor of organism A and organism B’ refers to a
single ancestral organism and all its descendants. Using
species as speciﬁers in deﬁnitions is unnecessary, and
furthermore problematic given the lack of a distinct
organisational level corresponding to species in such
taxa (Hull 1980; Ghiselin 1997; Lee 2003): the only
objective entities are organisms and clades of organisms.
However, in sexually reproducing taxa, there is an
additional organisational level above the organism that
needs to be considered: the lineage or ‘species’ (sensu de
Queiroz 1998). While both organism-level entities and
species-level entities can form clades, the clades usually
named using phylogenetic nomenclature are groups of
species. Accordingly, the entities employed when deﬁn-
ing such clades (speciﬁers) should be species. In Fig. 2A,
the phylogenetic deﬁnition ‘the clade stemming from the
most recent common ancestor of species A and B’
implicitly refers to a species-level ancestor (species C),
and thus neatly circumscribes species C, A and B.
However, consider in the context of the same phylogeny
a deﬁnition using organisms as speciﬁers: ‘the clade
stemming from the most recent common ancestor of
organisms X and Y’. The ancestor in question must be
an individual organism (since species cannot be ances-
tral to organisms). Tracing tokogenetic relationships
down the phylogeny reveals a problem, as there are
three candidate ancestors from the same generation.
Even if one of these can be chosen based on age (e.g.
organism Z) and nominated as the ‘most recent common
ancestor’, the (organism-level) clade stemming from this
ancestor includes some but not all organisms from each
of the three nominal species. While the discussion here
has used a node-based deﬁnition as an example,
identical problems affect stem- and apomorphy-based
deﬁnitions if the purpose is to name clades of species,
but organisms instead of species are used as speciﬁers.
When naming clades of sexual lineages (species), using
individual organisms as speciﬁers is therefore highly
problematic. By directly using organisms as speciﬁers,
the procedure attempts to avoid the problem of having
to deﬁne species. In doing so, however, it can end up
deﬁning clades of organisms which cut across species
boundaries. An analogy would be attempting to name
clades of (asexual) organisms by using individual cells as
speciﬁers – again, the cell lineages deﬁned can cut across
organismal boundaries (Fig. 1). Thus, if one wishes to
name a clade of species, there is no way to avoid the
difﬁcult problem of ﬁrst deﬁning at least some of those
species: the speciﬁer ( ¼ reference, type) species, and the
ancestral species implicated in the clade deﬁnition. More
generally, when constructing deﬁnitions of taxon names,
the speciﬁers (reference taxa) employed must be from
the appropriate hierarchical level. If the named clade
consists of organism-level entities, the speciﬁers should
be organisms, but if (as is usually the case) the named
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Fig. 2. Relationships between three sexual species (boxes A–C) and their component organisms (small circles ¼ males, small
squares ¼ females). The left and right ﬁgures depict identical relationships, but different organisms and tokogenetic lineages are
highlighted. The simpliﬁed ﬁgure in the centre shows relationships between the three species-level entities. (A) Three possible
ancestors are implicated by the deﬁnition ‘the clade stemming from the most recent ancestor of organisms X and Y’; relevant
tokogenetic relationships denoted by narrow solid lines, other tokogenetic relationships by dotted lines. (B) If any one of the
ancestors (e.g. Z) is chosen, the clade denoted cuts across species boundaries; organismal clade stemming from organism Z indicated
using solid lines and solid symbols.
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need to be species. Clades of species need to be deﬁned
using species-level speciﬁers, and those species in turn
need to be deﬁned using organism-level speciﬁers: it is
not possible to ignore a hierarchical level and deﬁne
clades of species directly using individual organisms.Acknowledgements
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